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THE FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS CONTROVERSY
-WHERE WE HAVE BEEN AND WHERE
WE SHOULD BE GOING
Paul C. Reardon*
INTRODUCTION
On October 2, 1966, the report of the American Bar Association
Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press' was released as a
tentative draft. The release culminated twenty months of intensive
work by the Committee, its Reporter, and its research staff. Since
then, many thousands of copies of the draft in printed form have
been distributed to judges, lawyers, schools of law and journalism,
and to persons in responsible positions in the press, radio and tele-
vision whose all important function is to keep the American people
informed. The news media and other groups have also completed
studies to which I shall refer. A great and entirely desirable debate
has now been under way for a number of months. In the remarks
which follow, it is my purpose, speaking for myself alone, but re-
flecting, I hope, the general sentiment of our Committee, to examine
the current posture of the Fair Trial-Free Press issue with some pref-
ace to indicate the chronology of events which have contributed to
the present debate, and with some recommendations for the future.
First, it would be something of an exaggeration to assert that the
news media of this country welcomed what we had to say with ex-
pressions of unalloyed delight. I have the distinction, and it is
probably unique, of having perused well over four thousand news
clips relating to the release of the report, as well as large numbers
of magazine articles, television station editorials, and public state-
ments by individuals who felt compelled to speak out. I thus harbor
a reaction to the reaction. It seems to me that in gross, and with the
exception of a number of very inquiring and perceptive editorials,
Associate Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts; Chairman, Advisory
Committee on Fair Trial-Free Press, American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal justice.
This article was adapted from an address delivered by Justice Reardon in connection
with the Distinguished Speakers Program at the University of San Diego School of
Law, February 14, 1967.
1 STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS-AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIA-
TION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (tentative draft
December, 1966) recommended by the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free
Press (hereinafter cited as THE CoMMrIrEE REPORT), available at the American
Bar Association, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois, at $2.00.
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[
the media have chosen to jump, and jump hard, not only on our
proposals but also upon the reasons for our existence and, sadly
in some instances, upon our motives. It is possible for me to illustrate
this statement with a myriad of references. However, one will suffice
and it is representative of many:
We regard the A.B.A. proposals as inimical to public safety and a
denial of the public's right to know. We sometimes wish that com-
mittees 'of busybodies seeking to infringe on the freedom of the
press would read the 1st amendment before they leap into action.2
The minor depression resulting from reading a plethora of edi-
torials exuding that temper has been counteracted temporarily by
certain other editorial comment such as:
This is a sincere and careful job and individual editors, exercising
their individual judgments, unquestionably will give very serious
consideration to what the committee says about the responsibility of
the press to help protect the fair trial principle.3
And thus we members of the Committee find ourselves in somewhat
of a maelstrom, waiting and hoping for careful comments, criticisms
and suggestions, and reluctant to proceed until we are satisfied
that we have garnered as much of all three as may originate from any
and all responsible sources.
HISTORICAL. BACKGROUND
With that much background, a little reference to history is in
order. For many years now the tensions in the area of fair trial-free
press have concerned thoughtful people. The impetus to study them
has roots in the distant past. The constitutional draftsmen of our
states and nation were steeped in the history of the Star Chamber,
the Five Knights case,4 and that of John Lilburn. Colonial endeavors
at news suppression as illuminated in the Zenger0 trial were known
to them. In my own state of Massachusetts, John Adams, the prin-
cipal author of our Constitution of 1780, placed before the State
constitutional convention the article which guaranteed to the press
in Massachusetts the freedoms which are now classic, and this was
eight years before the adoption of the Federal Constitution and
eleven years before the adoption of its first ten amendments. In the
2 Chicago Tribune, Oct. 3, 1966 (editorial).
3 Washington Evening Star, Oct. 5, 1966 (editorial).
4 3 HOWELL'S STATE TRLALs 1 (1627).
5 3 HOWELL'S STATE TRIAis 1315 (1637).
6 17 HOwEL'S STATE TRiALs 675 (1735).
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Massachusetts convention which ratified the Federal Constitution it
was proposed that such ratification be conditioned upon the addition
thereto of a Bill of Rights. Samuel Adams fought for the inclusion
in the ratification of a prohibition on the Congress from infringing
"the just liberty of the press" and the string on the ratification by
Massachusetts did not contain the prohibition simply because the
Convention was content that this local liberty was amply provided
for in the Massachusetts Constitution, then eight years old, and today
the oldest working constitution in the world.
I refer to all of this as an early instance of the concern of lawyers
for the problems of free press and fair trial. It was John Adams, a
lawyer, who gave us first in Massachusetts from his prodigious
knowledge of constitutional concepts and brought to our constitu-
tional convention the writing which resulted in free press guarantees
for our Commonwealth. It was also John Adams at an earlier day
who acted with enormous courage and at substantial personal risk
in undertaking the defense of the soldiers who stood accused fol-
lowing the Boston Massacre simply because of his deep personal
view that every man was entitled to a fair trial.
I suggest that there are not lacking in our later history other
evidences along the same line. Men of the law have consistently sup-
ported a free press when its need was greatest. I would hope, there-
fore, that however much disagreement there may be with our propos-
als in part, the suspicion, which has already found voice, that as law-
yers and judges we are agents of suppression, muzzling of the press
and advocates of the return of the Star Chamber will not continue.
The immediate reasons for the establishment of our Committee lay
largely, of course, in the presidential assassination. The Warren
Commission had stated that the event was "a dramatic affirmation of
the need for steps to bring about a proper balance between the right
of the public to be kept informed and the right of an individual to a
fair and impartial trial."7 The Commission had urged that the bar
law enforcement agencies, and the news media work together "to
establish ethical standards concerning the collection and presentation
of information to the public so that there will be no interference
with pending criminal investigations, court proceedings, or the right
of individuals to a fair trial."' In a sense the Commission report
7 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY 242 (Doubleday & Company, Inc.) (1964).
8 Id. at 27.
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focused on the press-trial problem to the extent that something in the
nature of a challenge was thrown out to the proper parties to get
on with some resolution of the problems the Commission was talking
about. But the Commission was not alone. Those of us who had for
some years been engaged in working on judicial seminars around
the United States were made acutely aware, even before the Warren
Commission reported, that as trial judges, and I was then one of
them, we had a very real enigma to fathom. Time and time again it
was my personal experience in these meetings to sense the preoc-
cupation of hard-working jury trial judges all over the country with
finding some answer to the practical difficulties which seemed to
besiege the free course of trial in the face of prejudicial publicity of
one kind or another. In states where judges are elected, and that is
the vast majority, the dilemma of the dedicated trial judge was hard
indeed. We have well over three thousand nisi prius trial judges in
this country. I have met hundreds of them and I never returned to
my home base after the many meetings with them without a feeling
that of all the problems they faced, whether in the field of sentencing,
of proper employment of probation, of relief of congested trial
dockets on the civil side, or others, the question of how best to handle
pre-trial and trial publicity with fairness to the public and the defen-
dant alike was uppermost in their minds. That this still is the case
is disclosed in the answers we received on one of a number of ques-
tions we addressed to trial judges in one of our Committee surveys
when 55 out of 68 voiced support of a rule of court restricting at-
torneys and law enforcement officials with respect to release of
information in criminal matters. The call for an attack on prejudicial
publicity, however, was most succinctly phrased, in my opinion, in an
address by Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School which he
delivered before the Section of Judicial Administration of the
American Bar Association in August of 1964 in New York. As a
departure point for a study, nothing that I have heard or read set out
the job which lay before the Committee better than this. The Dean
stated a view "that the basic problem will be greatly simplified if the
legal profession, both individually, through the organized bar, and
through the courts, more fully recognizes its basic responsibility in
this area, and takes firm and clear steps to meet this responsibility."
'
He then called for some remedial action by way of new ground
rules for lawyers and law enforcement agencies with appropriate
sanctions to enforce them.
9 Griswold, Responsibility of the Legal Profession, Harvard Today, Jan., 1965.
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THE COMMITTEE
At the same meeting at which Dean Griswold spoke, the Ameri-
can Bar Association authorized a three-year broadscale study,
financed by grants from three foundations, by the Project on Mini-
mum Standards for Criminal Justice. Chief Judge Lumbard of the
Second Circuit undertook to lead the project and our Committee
became one of six dealing with various facets of the administration
of criminal justice. I pause to note that once we had come together,
I took a look around and concluded that the Committee was not
heavily laden with bleeding hearts. Our membership comprised
two federal judges, one state supreme court justice, one former
federal judge and Deputy Attorney General of the United States,
two former A.B.A. presidents also members of the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement, one greatly experienced New York
jury trial judge, the State's Attorney for Cook County, Illinois, the
dean of a law school and former prosecutor, a California attorney
who was also a former prosecutor and president of the American
College of Trial Lawyers, and a Washington attorney of note soon
to be a member of the Supreme Court of the United States. It did
not seem to me then, nor does it now, that this was an aggregation
which would do other than perform the task assigned to it in the
fairest manner possible.
THE RESEARCH PROGRAM
At the threshold, the Committee was met with strong suggestions
from some quarters that it was time to lower the boom by means of
direct restrictions on the press. "It's time to give them the English
treatment," we were advised. What was urged upon us was amply
described in the Sherrill lectures given some years ago at Yale by
Sir Patrick Devlin, then Justice of the High Court of England. He
said that the process of contempt was a weapon used "in a manner
which I am sure would startle most pressmen in the United States.
Any comment on a matter that is sub judice and the publication of
any facts, not part of the evidence, that might influence a jury one
way or the other is capable of being contempt of court, even though
it is done innocently or by an error of judgment or under an honest
mistake."'" Though there has been some slight amendment of that
regimen since he gave the lectures, he stated what is essentially the
10 THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 119 (Yale University Press, New
Haven, 1958).
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English rule today. Now, notwithstanding some press comment to
the contrary, we refrained from adopting the English views and no
fair reading of our recommendations can lead to an opposite con-
clusion. I must say we were impressed by the vigor with which our
English brothers enforced their restrictions-a complete contrast to
our own experiences under Canon 20 which has never to our knowl-
edge, with one minor recent exception, been enforced in any
court at all. Yet it should be made clear that we did not rec-
ommend any statutory restrictions on the press-and there have
been legislative proposals to this end in this country lately--nor
did we recommend any expanded use of the contempt power.
We refrained in the interests of free public discussion of issues
which might be stifled under British rules and also because of
our own constitutional history. We were further convinced of the
wisdom of this course from consideration of the difficulties attendant
upon the drafting of restrictive statutes and because of the growth
of restraint in reporting which has recently marked a segment of the
American press and which springs from sober policy-making in this
field in the central management of the newspapers concerned. It
also seemed to us that, as Ronald Goldfarb has said, "the greatest
failure of English contempt law is its disrelation with its most valu-
able object-protection of fair trials. It is of little service to an
accused person who is written into jail by a prejudiced press that the
publisher or editor is fined or imprisoned... ."11 We thought also of
our American paradox where a reversal on the ground of prejudicial
publicity, as Zelmam Cowen once put it, "may well produce the result
that guilty men will go free because the courts deny to themselves the
power to control publicity which tends to prejudice the conduct of
trials, the verdict in which they will subsequently nullify because,
and only because, of that prejudicial publicity."1 In sum, therefore,
the Committee veered away from English practice. I reiterate that
one would hardly think so in the face of some of the comment I have
read.
Having defined an avenue down which we did not go, I should
like to discuss the method of our research and the net effect of what
we did recommend. First we were joined by a Reporter, David L.
Shapiro, Professor at the Harvard Law School with experience as a
11 Fair Trial vs. A Free Press 14 (1965) (An occasional paper on the Free Society
published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions of the Fund for the
Republic).
12 Id. at 12.
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practicing lawyer. Under him a team was put together which under-
took, and I can most quickly quote the report, " a broad program of
library and field research, including a full review of the literature
and reported decisions in a number of areas, a first-hand appraisal of
the approach adopted in the United Kingdom, and a concentrated
study of the practices and attitudes prevailing in three American
cities. . . ,,13 A one-month content analysis was made of the news-
paper of greatest circulation in twenty American cities and question-
naires were dispatched to police officials, prosecutors, defense coun-
sel, judges and editors in those cities. In the meantime the Committee
came together from time to time and met also on three occasions
with designated national representatives of the news media and also
with nationally known high police officials. I wish to make it clear
that the report, which reflects the collection of a sizable amount of
information procured through these means, makes no claim that it is
exhaustive. It is easy to visualize a pattern of research that could
consume years. Such research, including an elaborate empirical study
of juror behavior and the forces that affect that behavior, may be
feasible and desirable but I am inclined to doubt that the net result
of such an effort would lead to conclusions differing in essence from
those which we have reached. I make, therefore, no apology what-
ever for the method and extent of our survey. It was sufficient to
enable us to conclude as we did-that there is a large number of
cases in which a substantial danger of an unfair trial is created be-
cause potentially prejudiced information has reached the eyes and
ears of the triers of fact.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT
The Committee's recommendations are simply stated and are
directed almost exclusively to courts, to lawyers, and to law enforce-
ment agencies. They revolve around the strengthening of present
Canon 20 of the Canons of Ethics. As you are no doubt aware,
Canon 20 in its present form is framed in the most informal terms,
and without detail condemns in general "newspaper publications by
a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation." There are more
escape hatches than working space on that particular ship. We
recommend the adoption of restrictions carefully limited as to time
on the release of certain types of prejudicial information by lawyers
and law enforcement officers. We seek appropriate rules of court
13 THE COMMITTEE REPORT at 19.
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and police departmental rules to carry out the provisions of the
recommendations. We do this for our researches tell us that members
of the bar and law enforcement officers are the source of most of the
prejudicial news coverage. The recommendations would restrict law-
yers and the police from disclosure of an accused's prior cirminal
record, the existence or contents of any confession, or an accused's
failure to make any statement, the performance of any tests or ex-
aminations, information surrounding prospective witnesses, the possi-
bility of a guilty plea by the accused, and the defendant's guilt or
innocence, or other matters relating to the merits of the case or the
evidence in the case. These are the heart of the recommendations al-
though we have made certain suggestions relative to the conduct of
judicial proceedings in criminal cases with which I think few will
disagree. We have also recommended a limited use of the contempt
power against: (1) a person who, knowing that a criminal trial by
jury is in progress or that a jury is being selected, disseminates infor-
mation relative to the defendant or the issues of the case that goes
beyond the public record of the court if the statement is wilfully de-
signed to effect the outcome of the trial and seriously threatens to
have such an effect, (2) a person who makes such a statement with
the expectation that it will be so disseminated, and (3) a person
who knowingly violates a valid judicial order not to disseminate
certain specified information until the completion of the trial or
other disposition of the case. I emphasize that this is a very narrow
use of the power of contempt.
I also emphasize that provisions were made for eventual publica-
tion of a complete record of any proceedings taken in any prelimi-
nary hearing, bail hearing, or any other pretrial hearing in a crimi-
nal case where the hearing is held in chambers or otherwise closed
to the public. I emphasize, too, that under our recommendations
there would be no evidence taken at any time during the course of a
trial which would not be eventually fully open to public inspection,
and I make particular reference to that evidence taken outside the
hearing of a jury. In a speech in New York on January 27, 1967,
President Marden of the American Bar Association highlighted what
our report did not recommend, and, subject to what I have already
said, let me quote to you the effect of the report as he properly stated
it:
It would NOT restrict the public release by prosecutors or police
of the full facts and circumstances of an arrest at the time it was
made, together with information as to evidence seized.
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It would NOT proscribe official disclosure of the fact that an
investigation was under way in any area of criminal conduct.
It would NOT restrict the press or other news media from
disseminating publicly any information the media could develop
through their own initiative or resources about crimes committed or
about the administration of justice.
It does NOT advocate legislative restraints against the news
media, or any impairment of their freedom to criticize the courts or
any aspect of the administration of justice. It specifically rejects
that approach.
I might also add that the report did not recommend restrictions
on a description of the offense charged, a request for evidence, or the
release of any information needed in aid of the apprehension of a
suspect or to warn the public of any dangers he may present.
Let us now turn from the contents of the report to the reception of
the report by the public.
PUBLIC REACTION TO THE REPORT
As I have previously stated, the publication of the report has
produced repercussions. I should like to look with you at some of
these.
First, there was immediate reaction from the American Society of
Newspaper Editors through its committee which works on this
subject. A lengthy release14 from the Editors applauded us for our
efforts and promised a continuation of the cooperation which we
have enjoyed with them. The Editors took a very dim view, how-
ever, of our recommendations relative to strengthening Canon 20
and inhibiting releases by law enforcement agencies. They said,
"Putting prior restraint on news sources is equivalent to putting
prior restraint on the press." Our Committee is of the opinion that
proper disciplines exerted to produce a fair trial cannot be so char-
acterized, particularly when all information withheld for a time
under our recommendations will eventually be out in the public
domain. We are convinced that the years have proven that it is not
the press, and the press alone, that can be the judge of what public
statements should be made by lawers and law enforcement officials.
The Editors in setting up their guidelines said, "What is published
is, and under the American constitutional system must remain, the
14 The Bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, No. 502, Nov. 1,
1966, at 1.
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responsibility of the individual editor." Assume gross infractions by
the press the vice of which anyone would admit, and I might note
that some have occurred since our report came out; is it to be argued
that there should be no endeavor to correct such abuse at the source?
The Editors' comment and proposals in essence hold that conditions
are all right as they are. They alluded to an alleged paucity of cases
in which prejudice resulted in a mistrial or a conviction that was
reversed. But, as we have pointed out in our report, in a recent
period of but little over two years ending in March, 1965, there were
approximately one hundred reported decisions in cases where the
issue of prejudicial publicity was raised, and in a great many of
these the claim was plainly substantial.
We have said this is but the top of the iceberg for much discretion
is vested in these matters in the trial judge. And there is evidence
that this discretion is coming under increasing appellate concern.
Furthermore, for every reported appellate decision there lie under-
neath numerous matters handled without review of trial court action.
Of these we have catalogued not a few. What one does not find in a
central reporting service is an adequate description of the endless
days spent on voir dires at great private and public expense prior to
the commencement of trial where everyone in attendance from the
judge down is wrung dry in interrogations based on possible juror
prejudice emanating from dangerous publicity. Any judge who has
gone through this either at the nisi prius level or in review of a
record containing hundreds and hundreds of pages setting out the
process before a jury is finally seated is likely to hold strong views.
One English observer of distinction wrote recently: "Having been
present for two days at a voir dire in New York I can testify that the
questioning of the proposed jurymen was directed almost entirely to
what they had been reading, or might have been reading, in the local
press about the characters and antecedents of the accused and their
prospects of acquittal or conviction. If, as in the United Kingdom,
the newsmen were prohibited from discussing these subjects at all,
the lengths of the voir dire might diminish almost to vanishing point
with a vast saving of time and money."1 5 I thus fear the Committee
has a rather basic disagreement with the Editors as to whether we
have a problem.
Turning to the stand of the American Newspaper Publishers, one
discovers that their position is not greatly diverse from that of the
16 C. P. Harvey, FAIR TRIAL, v. FIE PRESS. A BiuTisH LAWYER'S ViEw. Los
Angeles Bar Bulletin, Jan., 1967, at 112.
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Editors. They have very recently published their study on fair trial
and free press.16 As I have publicly stated, there is much in what
they have said with which our Committee is in agreement. We too
hold that there is no basic incompatability between the guarantees of
the First and Sixth Amendments. The potential of the press in
assuring fair trial, which they allege, finds us in hearty sympathy.
We agree, with limitations, that "the press has a responsibility to
allay public fears and dispel rumors by the disclosure of fact." We
agree that "no rare or isolated case should serve as cause for censor-
ship and violation constitutional guarantees." We agree that neither
the press nor the bar "has the right to sit down and bargain" away
the people's right to a free press. The Committee does not consider
itself so engaged. But we emphatically disagree that "the presumption
of some members of the bar that pretrial news is intrinsically preju-
dicial is based on conjecture and not on fact." We disagree, first,
because we do not contend that all pretrial news is necessarily preju-
dicial, and we reassert that there exists a history rather fully docu-
mented in our Committee report to demonstrate to any impartial
observer that some publicity is prejudicial and that we are not pro-
ceeding on hunches or unjustified assumptions. The marrow of the
report of the Publishers is: "Things are all right. Don't rock the
boat!" We regret our inability to accede to those gentle persuasions.
There is a problem and all of us must face up to it. The underside
of the rug is now taxed to capacity. Perhaps the most startling asser-
tion in the Publishers' study is that which interdicts any attempt to
establish codes for, say the Publishers, "from our standpoint any
such codes would be without value because there is no way to en-
force them." In other words, the Publishers are saying that the
Committee's recommendations are not worthy of adoption because
teeth would be provided in the form of such sanctions as the legal
profession utilizes in its own house; at the same time the Publishers
opine that codes are worthless for the press because the codes lack a
biting edge. This stance completely negatives the moderate proposals
of the Warren Commission and must come as a shock indeed to the
publishers and editors in those states where there has been press-bar
cooperation on codes for some years now. And yet, how true the
statement in some states, for in my own Commonwealth we have
for some years had a code to which a number of metropolitan
dailies have not subscribed. It is only fair to state that many news-
10 FREE PREss AND FAt. TRiA. (American Newspaper Publishers Association, 750
Third Avenue, New York, New York 10017) (1967).
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papers in Massachusetts have been and are doing their best to abide
by it. I submit to you that the position of the Publishers must
necessarily undergo some change if the fair trial-free press problem
is to be resolved. I cannot forbear, and in good spirit, to quote to
them a portion of an editorial from one of their number, in one of
the most respected dailies in these United States. In commenting
upon our report the writer said, "One can dismiss the protests of
the American Newspaper Publishers Association as patently selfish
and short-sighted. To argue that 'there is an over-zealous concern
for the rights of defendants' shows that the ANPA remains de-
termined to keep well behind the times."' 7 I doubt this for I have
worked with the Publishers and they are men of principle. But I do
look forward to some future meetings which may help untangle
some of their thinking as well as assisting ours.
Also issued in December, 1966, was the statement of the directors
of the American Civil Liberties Union.'8 Reference was made therein
to the concern and action of this body in 1958 and to a belief that no
positive corrective action had been taken since. The ACLU thus
called upon courts, legislators, bar associations, and mass media to
adopt specific standards accompanied by appropriate sanctions. The
suggestions of the statement are closely parallel to our own. If we
vary, it is in the strictly limited application of contempt to the cir-
cumstances which I have described. Interesting to note is the agree-
ment of the ACLU directors with our suggestion on the handling of
the criminal records of the accused where we have parted company
with the instructions of the Attorney General to the Department of
Justice, that being the sole item of divergence between us and the
Attorney General.
CONCLUSION
In summing up, there are certain facts which I wish to call to your
attention. During these months of study and debate, some of the
agencies of publicity have made a sterling endeavor to discharge
their responsibilities in the fair trial-free press area. One thinks of
the guidelines which the Columbia Broadcasting System set for it-
self,19 as well as those of the Toledo Blade and Times.20 There are
17 Louisville Courier Journal, Oct. 2, 1966 (editorial).
18 STATEMENT, BoAn OF DmEcroRs ON FAIR TRIu AND FRE PRESS (American
Civil Liberties Union, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10010) (Dec., 1966).
19 Hearings on S. 290 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and he
Subcomm. on Improvement in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 455-56 (1965).
20 Toledo Blade and Times, Aug. 21, 1966, at 1, col. 8.
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many thoughtful editors who are disturbed and concerned. I know
this for I have heard from some of them. They at least recognize the
problem and heartily wish to work it out. I have in mind, for instance,
an editorial in the Patriot-Ledger, a Quincy, Massachusetts news-
paper.21 Let me quote to you a few lines. "No newspaper, radio or
television station has the right to disseminate prejudicial informa-
tion prior to or during a trial that will make it impossible for the
accused to secure fair and impartial justice. As a responsible news-
paper, we believe the right to an impartial trial must take prece-
dence in any clear-cut issue involving pretrial publicity. . . . The
public has the right to know the truth. However, this right does not
extend to irresponsible reporting, to prejudicial statements by prose-
cutors and police, or to hearsay or rumor. There have been too many
examples of this type of irresponsible reporting of crime news to
ignore the fact that there is a very real problem involving pre-trial
publicity. To end these abuses and to protect the rights of the accused,
we need explicit guidelines spelling out exactly what kind of in-
formation about a defendant can be revealed before his trial and
which information should be withheld. These guidelines must apply
to lawyers, the police, the judiciary and the news media as to their
respective responsibilities in the handling of information relating to
persons accused of crimes." Other editorial examples could be cited,
as I said initially.
I sense at the same time a concern on the part of the press that
this debate will lead to the secrecy which tarnished court procedures
in the days of the Stuart kings and which our forefathers strove
valiantly to erase. Already, it is said, the recommendations of the
Advisory Committee report are being applied throughout the country
and news sources are drying up. The carefully phrased order22 of
Judge Talty relative to press conduct when he presided over the
second Sheppard trial recently is cited as a portent of further restric-
tions to come. And yet at least one reporter in that closely super-
vised trial has written to the effect that what seemed impossible from
the press point of view at first, worked out well indeed in practice
as the trial proceeded. Some of the most fascinating reactions which
have reached me have come from editors and judges in the British
Commonwealth who wonder what all the press worry is about. One
such letter from an editor in Sydney, Australia remarked that he had
read our work, that it was so moderate he could not understand the
-21 The Patriot-Ledger, Jan. 7, 1967 (editorial).
22 Order issued on No. 64, 571, Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio,
Oct. 19, 1966, State of Ohio v. Sam H. Sheppard.
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play-back that we were receiving, and concluded in effect that we
had launched only a challenge to good reporting. Whether this be so
I cannot say.
Finally, I should like to refer you to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who
exhibited great sensitivity in dealing with fair trial and free press.
In the dissent in Stroble v. California, he said, "The moral health of
the community is strengthened by according even the most miserable
and pathetic of criminals those rights which the Constitution has
designed for us all."23 Again, concurring in Irvin v. Dowd, he said,
"One of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the State
has the burden of establishing guilt solely on the basis of evidence
produced in court and under circumstances assuring an accused all
the safeguards of a fair procedure. These rudimentary conditions
for determining guilt are inevitably wanting if the jury which is to
sit in judgment on a fellow human being comes to its task with its
mind ineradicably poisoned against him. How can fallible men and
women reach a disinterested verdict based exclusively on what they
heard in court when, before they entered the jury box, their minds
were saturated by press and radio for months preceding by matter
designed to establish the guilt of the accused." '24
The whole task of the Committee has been to alleviate those
conditions to which Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred. We have
attempted to do this by the imposition of self-disciplines on the
agencies and actors over which we believe the courts have control.
In so doing we have followed the past press suggestion that we
dean our own house. It remains only to say that in this debate, as
President Marden of the American Bar Association recently stated,
there should be no winners. It is not a question of winning a battle.
Rather there is opportunity for all good Americans, be they in the
media, on the bench, or among the bar, to go forward together to
settle what differences may exist to the end that the administration
of criminal justice may be strengthened and to the end that, this
question having been resolved, we may in company move on to other
spheres. The American news media have the Committee's pledge of
further full cooperation, so that in concert we may in free and open
discussion find the answer which I firmly believe we all are seeking.
23 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
24 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
